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The problems of boom-bust patterns of financial markets have a long history 
(Kindleberger,1982). Its frequency has been high since the 1970s, as a result of both 
financial liberalization and inadequate prudential regulation. Indeed, the world financial 
crisis provided further evidence that unless properly regulated, financial markets are 
prone to harmful boom-bust patterns, often leading to costly crises (Soros, 2008). In 
contrast, when financial systems have been simpler and better regulated, as in the quarter 
of a century that followed the Second World War, crises were infrequent. 
The devastating effects of financial crises became particularly evident in recent 
decades in numerous developing countries, particularly during the Latin American debt 
crisis of the 1980s and the East Asian and Russian crises of 1997-98. The latter gave rise 
to an important discussion on reform of the international financial architecture. However, 
after a positive start, progress on reform became very disappointing till 2007: too little 
was achieved at the international level, and most of the action took place at the national 
level in the developing world, particularly in the areas or financial regulation, reduction 
of debt burdens and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.1 This lack of progress in 
the international financial architecture was particularly problematic as the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression hit the world. Although this crisis originated in the 
United States and some other industrial countries, for a period it affected the developing 
countries extremely hard, even though they were largely innocent bystanders. 
As a result both of the extreme severity of the crisis, which started in 2007 and 
became acute after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, some relatively 
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significant changes are starting to occur in the international financial architecture. At the 
time of writing, those changes seem particularly important in aspects of international 
official liquidity provision, especially via the IMF and in a fairly significant attempt at 
strengthening and improving financial regulation in developed countries, with some 
though still incipient international coordination. Some quite important changes have also 
been made in global governance, even though these are still insufficient. 
This paper analyzes the central issues of global governance to guarantee a 
development-friendly international financial architecture. It is divided in five sections. 
The first analyzes the effects of capital account volatility and proposes that a 
development-friendly architecture should have a strong counter-cyclical focus. The 
second section examines crisis prevention, particularly the role of prudential and capital 
account regulations. Section III looks at better management of crises: IMF lending 
facilities, debates surrounding conditionality, and debt workouts. Section IV examines 
the reform of the Global Reserve System. Throughout the paper, we discuss ongoing 
reform efforts and point out the areas where far deeper reforms in the international 
financial architecture are needed. 
I. A COUNTER-CYCLICAL FRAMEWORK FOR A DEVELOPMENT-
FRIENDLY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 
The last three decades have made developing countries, particularly those more 
integrated into world financial markets, swing at the rhythm of highly pro-cyclical 
external financing. The succession of booms and sudden stops in financing has had strong 
effects on these countries. In this regard, the recent global crisis was not only massive, 
but its impact on capital flows to developing countries was even larger than that caused in 
previous crises that originated in the developing countries themselves. Indeed, the 
Institute for International Finance (2009) estimated a decline of these capital flows of 
almost 8 percent of emerging countries’ GDP during the 2007-09 period. However, 
thanks to the massive interventions by major countries to contain the crisis, this shock 
was short in terms of its impact.. Since mid-2009, capital flows started to return to 
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developing countries and by 2010 many emerging economies were facing the opposite 
problem: a new surge of capital flows. 
Financial volatility has a direct impact on the balance of payments and domestic 
financial markets, and, through these avenues, on domestic economic activity and other 
macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, in the face of strong swings of private capital 
markets, developing countries have tended to lose the “policy space” to adopt 
autonomous counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies, and faced difficult challenges 
creating deep financial markets. A vicious circle involving pro-cyclical financing, 
incomplete financial markets and institutions, and constraints to macroeconomic policy 
emerged. The unfortunate outcome of this dynamics is that “twin” external and domestic 
financial crises became far more frequent. Paradoxically, such twin crises spread even in 
2009 and 2010 to some European developed countries. 
 This study thus argues forcefully that the major task of a development-
friendly international financial architecture is to try to curb the pro-cyclical and volatile 
nature of financial markets and to mitigate the pro-cyclical effects of financial markets 
and open “policy space” for counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies in the developing 
world (Ocampo and Griffith-Jones, 2008). 
Trade and terms of trade fluctuations play a major role in the determination of 
business cycles in developing countries. Indeed, the widespread shift towards export-led 
strategies in the developing world has increased the importance of the trade channel as a 
mechanism to transmit crises amongst countries, as the recent crisis indicates (see 
Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2009). Domestic macroeconomic policies and political 
factors also play a role in determining business cycles. Since the 1970s, however, 
business cycles in developing countries have been characterized by the leading role 
played by capital account fluctuations. This has been particularly true for economies 
more integrated into world financial markets, the “emerging economies.” 
Boom-bust cycles reflect investor herding and associated contagion –of both 
optimism and pessimism. Volatility is associated with significant changes in risk 
evaluation, which involve the alternation of periods of “appetite for risk” (more precisely, 
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underestimation of risks) with periods of a “flight to quality” (risk aversion). Market-
sensitive risk management practices as well as other features of financial markets (e.g. 
evaluation of managers against competitors) increase herding (Persaud, 2000). 
Furthermore, due to information asymmetries, different assets tend to be pooled together 
in risk categories that are viewed by market agents as being strongly correlated. This 
practice turns such correlations into self-fulfilling prophecies. As pointed out, this has 
been again dramatically shown in the 2007-09 financial turmoil of developed countries, 
particularly in the United States and in the banking and sovereign debt crises in Europe. 
Boom-bust cycles have given a renewed relevance to endogenous unstable 
dynamics of financial markets analyzed by Minsky(1982), who emphasizes how financial 
booms generate excessive risk taking by market agents, which eventually leads 
economies into crises. From a different theoretical perspective, a similar explanation was 
suggested by White (2006), who underscores how “search for yield” characteristic of low 
interest rate environments generates incentives for credit creation, carry trade, and 
leverage that easily build up asset bubbles. As the BIS stated, back in 2005: “The main 
risks to the financial sector could stem from financial excesses linked to a generalized 
complacency towards risk, reinforced by a benign short-term outlook” (BIS, 2005, 
p.120). This warning sounds particularly prescient in light of later events.  
In developing countries, fluctuations in capital markets have been reflected in the 
pro-cyclical pattern of spreads, variations in the availability of financing (absence or 
presence of credit rationing), and in maturities. This involves short-term volatility, such 
as very intense upward movement of spreads and the periods of interruption (rationing) 
of financing observed during the Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises. More importantly, 
they also involve medium-term cycles, as the experience of the past three decades clearly 
demonstrates. During this period, three full medium-term cycles have been experienced: 
a boom of external financing in the 1970s, followed by a major debt crisis in the 1980s; a 
new boom in the 1990s, followed by a sharp reduction in net flows after the Asian and 
Russian crises of 1997-98. Since 2002-03 a new such cycle began, which was followed 
by the financial turbulence associated to the global crisis, now moving to a new stage of 
surges. 
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Different types of capital flows show different volatility patterns. The higher 
volatility of short-term capital indicates reliance on such financing is highly risky (Rodrik 
and Velasco, 2000), whereas the smaller volatility of FDI vis-à-vis all forms of financial 
flows is considered a source of strength. However, “financial engineering” may be 
making different flows increasingly similar. Particularly, the use of risk management 
techniques by multinationals, via derivatives, may make FDI in critical moments as 
volatile as traditional financial flows (Dodd and Griffith-Jones, 2007). 
During booms, developing countries viewed by markets as “success” stories are 
almost inevitably drawn into the capital account boom, inducing private-sector deficits 
and risky balance sheets (French-Davis, 2001). However, even countries with weak 
fundamentals may be drawn into the boom and all countries, again with some 
independence from their fundamentals, will be drawn into “sudden stops” of external 
financing.  
Conditions are particularly difficult in developing countries during crises because 
rising risk premiums and reduced availability of external financing may eliminate the 
room for counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies, and may rather force them to 
adopt pro-cyclical policies –i.e., high interest rates and tight fiscal policies. Thus, while 
most industrial countries have in the past been able to smooth pro-cyclical effects of 
credit and asset prices through counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies, developing 
countries may be forced to adopt pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies that reinforce the 
pro-cyclical movements of financial markets. It should be pointed out that European 
countries like Greece and Ireland have been forced into pro-cyclical policies in 2009, thus 
following a similar pattern to that suffered in the past by developing countries. 
There is also widespread evidence that ample private sector financing encourages 
pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies during booms. Thus, unstable external financing 
distorts incentives that both private agents and authorities face throughout the business 
cycle, inducing a pro-cyclical behavior of economic agents and macroeconomic policies 
(Kaminsky et al., 2004). In the words of Stiglitz (2003), increased exposure to financial 
market risks replaced Keynesian automatic stabilizers with automatic de-stabilizers. 
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Contrary to the view that liberalization would allow financial markets to play a 
disciplining role, dependence on financial swings encouraged adoption of pro-cyclical 
monetary and fiscal policies.  
Although pro-cyclicality is inherent in financial markets, domestic financial and 
capital account liberalization in the developing world have clearly and significantly 
accentuated its effects. A lag in developing adequate prudential regulation and 
supervision frameworks, in both developing and developed economies, increases the risks 
of financial liberalization.  
The costs of such financial volatility in the developing world are high. There is 
now overwhelming evidence that pro-cyclical financial markets and macroeconomic 
policies have increased growth volatility and have not encouraged growth in the 
developing world (Prasad et al., 2003). The efficiency gains from financial market 
integration are swamped by the negative effects of growth volatility. 
Eichengreen (2004) estimated that over the past twenty-five years, incomes of 
developing countries had been 25 percent lower due to currency and banking crises. 
Others have estimated even higher average annual costs of crises. Indonesia experienced 
larger falls in output and incomes during the Asian crisis than the United States during 
the Great Depression. 
Each medium-term financial cycle may have specific features. The most recent 
one was characterized by an unprecedented accumulation of international reserves and 
reduced debt ratios by developing countries, which may be seen as “self-protection” 
against the financial instability experienced during previous crises (see Griffith-Jones and 
Ocampo, 2010, and section IV of this paper). Such self-protection, together with rapid 
development of local currency bond markets strengthened the defenses of developing 
countries against crisis. However, in spite of the major efforts in this areas and 
improvements in other policies (e.g., better macroeconomic and financial regulation 
policies), most developing countries were very severely hit by the global financial crisis. 
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 New channels of transmission of crisis have emerged or become more prominent. 
First, as previously pointed out, increased dependence of developing countries on export-
led strategies has implied that both commodity-dependent and industrial exporters have 
made them more vulnerable to transmission of crisis via the trade channel.  
Second, as the old forms of financial volatility have continued to affect the 
developing countries, new sources of potential pro-cyclicality of capital flows have 
emerged. They are related to the explosive growth of derivatives worldwide. In 
developing economies, derivative contracts are being used by international hedge funds 
and investment banks to speculate, for example, via the carry trade. Large parts of these 
derivative markets are not regulated (as they operate in the OTC market and offshore). 
The reversal of this carry trade as the crisis intensified in 2008 led to significant capital 
outflows and depreciation pressures on currencies in several major emerging economies. 
In 2010 the carry trade has contributed to facilitate very large inflows, which have 
contributed to excessive strengthening of their currencies and rising asset prices. 
Third, uncertainties associated with the risk of a disorderly unraveling of global 
imbalances and especially the major effect of the current financial crises is drastically 
changing the prospect for developing economies. A major paradox is that measures of 
“self-protection” of developing countries (current account surpluses, large increases of 
international reserves and reduced indebtedness) are also part of global imbalances. The 
new sources of strength of developing countries, when viewed on a country-by-country 
basis, turn out to be one of the elements of vulnerability for developing countries as a 
whole. 
II. CRISIS PREVENTION 
Though crises have complex causes, experience indicates that liberalization of 
financial markets, especially if not accompanied by appropriate regulation, is the major 
cause of costly and damaging crises. This does not imply that financial crises are 
inevitable, but that they may be prevented or ameliorated, by appropriate public policy 
and, especially, by regulation. 
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A short look at history indicates the validity of this statement. After the Great 
Depression, the financial sector –particularly, but not only in the US– was re-regulated 
carefully, most notably in the US by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. During the next 
forty years, the financial sector throughout the world was closely regulated, capital 
accounts were fairly closed, and there were practically no financial crises. Since the 
1970s, and especially during the 1980s and 1990s, there was massive de-regulation, both 
at national and international level. Since the 1980s, there have been very frequent and 
very deep financial crises, both in the developing and developed world.  These crises 
have been extremely costly in terms of growth and development. 
The only silver lining that appears during these costly crises is that they provide a 
political opportunity to carry out desirable regulatory reforms. The depth of the current 
crisis in the developed economies, and particularly in the United States, may represent in 
this sense an opportunity. It has led to massive bail-outs and costly public 
recapitalizations of many financial institutions in those countries, which are very costly to 
taxpayers and, therefore, caused a great deal of anger. The crisis threatened to lead to an 
unacceptably serious and possibly long recession globally or at least a major slowdown 
of growth, especially in the developed countries. As a consequence, there emerged 
significant political appetite for more and better regulation. Furthermore, it is 
increasingly clear that effective regulation is not just in the interests of the real economy, 
it is also in the interest of the stability of the financial system itself, as well as of 
individual financial institutions. Moreover, for a country to have a competitive financial 
system, it needs to be well regulated.  Indeed, steps are beginning to be taken to improve 
regulation, and this issue has been central to the G-20 agenda at the global level and to 
important actions especially in the US (the Dodd-Frank Bill) as well as in Europe; also 
important is the approval of Basle III for banking regulation (see below). 
The key question in policy circles became therefore not whether to regulate, but 
how best to do it. In thinking about the future shape of the financial system and its 
regulation, it is important to be clear about its purpose. The financial sector should be 
seen as a means to an end: it should serve the real economy, and thus the needs of 
households and enterprises to consume and invest. On the positive side, governments 
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should encourage the financial sector to create financial innovations and instruments that 
support growth and development in a sustainable way. But they should also use 
regulation to avoid systemic risk being generated, thus preventing future crises, which 
can be so disruptive to the real economy. 
The principles on which financial regulation needs to be built are based, to an 
important extent, on the causes of this and previous crises. This relates to the inherent 
flaws in the way that banking and capital markets operate. In particular, the main 
manifestation of market failure in those markets is, as we already indicated in section I, 
their boom-bust pattern. A first task of regulation is therefore to help overcome these pro-
cyclical patterns of behavior, therefore a first principle of regulation needs to be that of 
counter-cyclicality.  
The second major cause of crises is –as briefly mentioned above– rapid 
liberalization within and across countries, which has been accompanied by insufficient, 
incomplete, and inappropriate financial regulation. Indeed, the excesses of financial 
liberalization and the major mistakes of regulation, as well as its incompleteness, imply a 
massive policy failure. 
To overcome the failures –both of markets and of policy– that have been major 
factors contributing to the current crisis, two key principles of regulation need therefore 
to be followed: one is that of introducing counter-cyclicality at the heart of regulation, the 
second is the need for regulation to be comprehensive, so that the domain of regulation 
coincides with the domain of the market. 
Capital account liberalization and the strong pro-cyclical pattern of capital flows 
to developing countries are also major sources of crises in these countries, as indicated in 
the first section of this paper. This implies that prudential regulation should be 
complemented with capital account regulations. Indeed, the limits between the two are 
sometimes difficult to discern, as they can sometimes be used as alternative ways to 
manage the two basic underlying problems: pro-cyclical flows and currency mismatches 
in portfolios. 
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In what follows, we start by looking at the two basic principles of prudential 
regulation: comprehensiveness and counter-cyclicality. We then look at currency 
mismatches and capital account regulation. We finally take a short look at the issue of 
remuneration of bankers, which has also shown to induce pro-cyclicality. 
Although we underscore in this paper the two basic principles of prudential 
regulation, there are other, well-established ones: consumer protection, restricting 
monopoly power (a major issue looking forward, as private finance is experiencing rapid 
concentration), and encouraging portfolio diversification. Suffice is it to say that even 
these well established principles were not followed before the global crisis. The first of 
these functions should be considerably enhanced to avoid the supply of toxic mortgages 
and highly risky investment vehicles offered to unsophisticated agents during the recent 
boom in many countries. In this sense the creation in the US of the autonomous financial 
consumer protection agency, as part of the Dodd Frank legislation was an important step 
in the right direction. 
A. Comprehensive prudential regulation 
Financial systems–both nationally and internationally– have undergone very large 
changes. Regulation had clearly not kept up. 
In the United States and other developed countries like the UK, there had been a 
massive shift of savings from banks to capital markets. As pointed out in d’Arista and 
Griffith-Jones (2010), in 2007, only 25 percent of the US financial systems’ assets 
belonged to commercial banks. 
However, commercial banks were the only part of the financial system that were 
regulated for capital requirements, and even that regulation was partial, as off-balance 
sheet instruments, such as Structured Investment Vehicles, were practically unregulated. 
Investment banks were very lightly regulated. Other financial actors, like hedge funds, 
were not regulated at all. Germany pioneered the discussion of regulating hedge funds 
before the global crisis; this discussion became more intense, for example, in the 
European Parliament and European Commission after the crisis started. After long 
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debates, and intensive lobbying by hedge funds and equity funds, European legislation 
has been approved on alternative investment vehicles. Moreover, the powerful rating 
agencies were also unregulated.  For some of the financial instruments, such as Over-the-
Counter (OTC) derivatives that grew to astronomical levels in the last decade, there was 
no transparency and even less regulation. Again here both in the US and in Europe 
important efforts have been made to increase transparency, and even improve regulation 
of derivatives, though unfortunately important exceptions remain (for more details, see 
below). Off-shore centers, furthermore, are subject to no or extremely light regulation. 
As a result of these regulatory shortages, a massive “shadow financial system” 
was allowed to emerge, which had no or very little transparency or regulation. Indeed, 
regulatory arbitrage –moving transactions from more to less regulated financial activities 
and centers– often drove, or at least strongly encouraged, the growth of financial activity 
and of risk taking. Indeed, many of the problems that caused the financial crisis arose 
mainly in institutions (e.g. mortgage lenders) or instruments (e.g. credit default swaps) 
that were not regulated. This is similar to many previous developing country financial 
crises, where, too, the most liberalized and unregulated parts of the financial system were 
major causes of crises. 
In capital markets, there was practically no formal regulation. Private actors, such 
as insurance companies, pretended that they were able to sell systemic risk insurance, like 
credit default swaps (CDS).  Some of those major insurance companies, like AIG in the 
US, had to be rescued and effectively nationalized, as they essentially became bankrupt 
during the crisis. This was because they did not have sufficient capital and reserves to 
fulfill credit swap insurance contracts that had a massive amount of systemic risk. Indeed, 
no entity –except the government– was capable of fulfilling credibly such a contract once 
the crisis spread. Thus, the government not only became the lender of last resort, but also 
the insurer of last resort, because it had not previously exercised regulation to limit the 
risk that afterwards it had to assume (see Mehrling, 2010). 
To summarize, regulation has to be comprehensive so that the domain of the 
regulator coincides with the domain of the market; if not, regulatory arbitrage will be 
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inevitable. Another reason – illustrated by recent events, when bail-outs and rescues have 
been massive –is that there is a need to have comprehensive regulation to avoid moral 
hazard. 
A pre-condition for effective comprehensive regulation is comprehensive 
transparency. Thus, Over-the-Counter derivatives should all be brought on the exchanges 
(even if this implies certain micro-economic costs). Off-balance sheets instruments, like 
Structured Investment Vehicles, should be brought into balance sheets, and on-site 
inspection of banks and other financial institutions should be expanded.  
The new US legislation (the Dodd frank Bill), which obliges all standardized  
derivatives to pass through clearing- houses is a positive step to improve transparency 
and reduce counterparty risk ; ideally  it should be applied to all derivative transactions. It 
is therefore unfortunate that the US legislation has maintained a series of exceptions, 
especially for derivatives used by non-financial companies. A positive aspect of the US 
legislation, however, is that it imposes margin requirements on all the derivatives that go 
through clearing houses, which diminishes their risks, though again there are exceptions 
for those that do not go through clearing houses. We can expect European regulation to 
follow these US reforms on transparency in the derivatives markets, but it is to be feared 
that they will also allow important exceptions.  
As pointed out, in the case of alternative investment funds, especially for hedge 
funds, it is the European Union that has taken initiatives to improve transparency by 
requiring their registration, as well as proposing some precautionary regulatory measures; 
these proposals, though watered down, have now been approved in spite of opposition 
from financial players and the reservations of some countries. As regards alternative 
investment funds, the US legislation not only took initiatives to improve their 
transparency, but also opened the possibility that the newly created Systemic Risk 
Council can declare these funds as systemically important, when they are large financial 
players, and thus impose limits on their leverage or other risk mitigating measures. 
The creation of this Council, as well as its equivalent at European level –the 
European Systemic Risk Board—, whose objective is macro-prudential regulation, are 
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institutional innovations that are potentially very positive. It is also very positive that a 
rather ambitious architecture has been created at European level of three sector pan-
European regulators for key financial sectors (one for banks, another for insurance and 
pensions, and a third one for capital markets). 
These steps imply that it has been recognized that financial intermediaries that are 
systemically important should be subject to particularly rigorous supervision, and even to 
stricter regulatory norms than other institutions. This issue has received particular 
attention in the United States. In 2010, President Obama announced limits on the size of 
banks. Since 1994, there are limits on the ratio of total deposits (10%) that can be held by 
one bank; the new rule would also apply to other liabilities.  
Another important measure announced by President Obama proposed to ban the 
use of bank resources in their own trading (so-called “proprietary trading”). In fact, the 
US legislation approved has introduced the so called “Volcker rule”, which forbids the 
use of the banks’ own resources and that of its depositors for its own capital market 
business. However, this rule was diluted in the debates in Congress, and the resulting 
legislation, when banks were allowed to maintain property of alternative investment 
funds (hedge funds and equity funds) up to 3% of their Tier 1 capital. 
Comprehensive regulation should relate both to liquidity and solvency. As regards 
solvency, equivalent regulation of different actors, instruments and activities should 
especially refer to leverage, as excessive leverage has been such a major source of 
systemic risk. It is therefore positive that Basel III, as discussed below, has introduced 
limits on leverage. However, as the longevity of funding is an important variable, it may 
be desirable to restrict leverage more (and thus require more capital) for assets funded by 
short-term liabilities. This will not just protect the solvency of financial institutions, but 
also encourage them to seek more long-term funding. 
Persaud (2010) has forcefully argued that tying leverage requirements to maturity 
of funding (“mark-to-funding”) will also encourage diversity of behavior amongst 
different actors, thus discouraging herding across different categories of financial actors. 
Persaud proposes, in this regard, that, whatever they are called, those financial 
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institutions that have short-term funding –say less than 12-24 months– should follow 
bank capital adequacy requirements. Those with long term funding could have a different 
long term “solvency” regime, that would take into account their long-term obligations 
and long-term valuation of their assets.  It is however key that the concept of maintaining 
equivalent regulation of leverage, for all actors, instruments, and activities, is 
implemented, in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage. 
Separate and sufficient minimum liquidity requirements should be an essential 
part of regulation, an aspect that was neglected in Basel I and Basel II, but which has 
been introduced into Basel III, as the global crisis showed the need for such regulations.  
We will now discuss in some detail the proposal approved in principle in 
September 2010 as Basel III (Basel Committee, 2010). The proposal agreed in principle 
by the 27 countries in September 2010 has a number of positive elements. Firstly, it 
raises Tier 1 capital requirement, the core form of loss absorbing capital) from 2% to 
4.5% of risk-weighted assets, as well as defining far more strictly the assets that make up 
this capital, to strengthen the solvency of financial institutions. The proposal also 
increases the capital for banks’ operations in the financial markets (the so called trading 
book) and requires an additional capital conservation buffer of 2.5%. This implies banks 
should have 7% of common equity. It also implies introducing additional buffers of 
counter-cyclical capital, in a range of 0 to 2.5% of common equity, which would be 
implemented nationally, along lines we discuss below. Finally, the liquidity requirements 
are made explicit, which, as pointed out , were practically non- existent in Basel II; it also  
introduces a maximum leverage ratio, calculated on total assets and not on risk-weighted 
assets, whose aim is to restrict the total of assets in relation to capital.  
Nevertheless, Basel III has several serious problems (for a more detailed analysis 
see for example Griffith-Jones, Silvers and Thiemann, 2010). First of all, many observers 
consider that the increases of capital requirements are not enough, especially for banks 
with very risky assets. A second important critique relates to the excessively long time 
period in which they will they be implemented, culminating in 2022. The main reason is 
that there have been strong pressures by the banks, both to avoid even higher capital 
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increases and for delaying the reforms. This was combined, in the latter case, with the 
fear by regulators that an early increase in capital requirements would discourage even 
more the ability and willingness of banks to lend, which is considered key for the 
recovery. 
A more radical critique is that maintaining risk-weighted assets capital 
requirements may be inadequate, and that it would be better to give a larger role to 
leverage. Furthermore it seems likely that the leverage indicator has been put at an 
excessively high level, as it can reach 33. Another set of questions relate to the design of 
the liquidity buffers, which may end up by discriminating against loans to SMEs, which 
play a key role in job creation. Further research is required here. There is also an 
important concern whether stricter regulation of banks will not cause financial activity to 
move even more to the less or unregulated entities. 
It should be emphasized, finally, that the possible discrimination in the 
regulations against developing countries, by ignoring the benefits of diversification of 
lending to borrowers with lower correlation of risks, has not been corrected in the new 
proposals. Therefore, it would be highly desirable if Basel III would incorporate a factor 
that takes account of the benefits of diversification towards that type of assets, as has 
already been done for loans to small and medium enterprises in Basel II (as proposed for 
example in Griffith-Jones, Segoviano and Spratt, 2002). In fact, the recent crisis, and 
above all the following evolution, in which developing countries have in general had 
higher growth rates than developed ones, confirms the need to introduce the benefits of 
diversification in Basel III.   
B. Counter-cyclical prudential regulation 
As pointed out, the most important manifestation of market failure in financial 
markets through the ages is pro-cyclicality. In fact, risk is mainly generated in the booms, 
even though it becomes apparent in the bust. Therefore, the time for regulators to act –to 
prevent excessive risk taking– is precisely in the boom. Indeed, one of their key functions 
is “to take away the punch-bowl when the party is at its best.” As a consequence, 
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prudential financial regulation has to have at its heart the principle of counter-cyclicality 
which implies “leaning against the wind.” 
This needs to happen through simple rules which cannot be easily changed by 
regulators so they will not become “captured” by the general over-enthusiasm that 
characterizes booms that have so often lead to undesirable relaxation of regulatory 
standards. 
In fact, under Basle II, bank regulation did exactly the opposite. Particularly in the 
advanced approach, Basle II calculated required capital based on the banks own models; 
this perversely incorporates the inherent pro-cyclicality of bank lending into bank 
regulation, thus accentuating boom-bust patterns. This interacted with the use of mark to 
market pricing, which links asset booms with excessive leverage. 
It is very encouraging that the G-20 leaders, the Basle Committee, and in several 
major reports on financial regulation (such as the Stiglitz, Turner and de Larosiere 
Reports), there is very clear emphasis on the need to introduce counter-cyclicality as a 
key principle of regulation. Even more encouraging is that Basel III, as mentioned above, 
has introduced a counter-cyclical capital buffer, though details are still being worked out. 
Indeed, one element that must be central to reform of prudential regulation is 
therefore counter-cyclical regulation of leverage, or its counterpart, the capital backing 
of financial institutions, in a broad sense, including provisions. This is equally, if not 
more, true of regulation in developing countries 
Counter-cyclical regulation implies that the traditional microeconomic focus of 
prudential regulation and supervision be complemented by a macro-prudential 
perspective, particularly by introducing explicit counter-cyclical features in prudential 
regulation and supervision that would compensate for the pro-cyclicality of financial 
markets. The simplest recommendations are to increase capital and/or provisions for loan 
losses during booms, and to avoid mark-to-market asset pricing from feeding into 
leverage, such as counter-cyclical limits on loan-to-value ratios and/or rules to adjust the 
values of collateral for cyclical asset price variations.  
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Counter-cyclical bank regulation can be easily introduced, either through banks' 
provisions or through their capital. Introducing counter-cyclical bank provisions has 
already been done for some time in Spain and Portugal, showing that this is a feasible 
option. The Spanish system requires higher provisions when credit grows more than the 
historical average, linking provisioning to the credit and business cycles (Ocampo, 2003). 
Under this system, provisions build up during an upswing and can be accumulated in a 
fund (along with special back-up for non-performing assets or borrowers under stress). 
The fund can be drawn down in a slump to cover loan losses. This counters the financial 
cycle as it both discourages (though does not eliminate) excessive lending in booms and 
strengthens the banks for bad times. 
Introducing counter-cyclical provisions in Spain has been facilitated by the fact 
that the design of accounting rules is under the authority of the Central Bank of Spain. 
This helps overcome the issue that accountants in other countries do not readily accept 
the concept of “latent” or expected losses, on which the Spanish system is based. They 
prefer instead to focus on actual losses, which is more relevant for short-term investors. 
However, accounting principles should be designed in ways that balance the short-term 
needs of investors with those of individual and systemic bank stability. Currently work is 
being done at international level to achieve better designs. 
More directly counter-cyclical rules regarding changes in the credit exposure of 
financial institutions would also be desirable. Particularly, financial institutions could be 
asked to increase general or sector-specific provisions when there is an excessive growth 
of credit relative to a benchmark, a bias in lending toward sectors subject to strong 
cyclical swings and to the growth in foreign currency loans to sectors producing non-
traded goods (see below). Indeed, all maturity and currency mismatches on balance 
sheets as well as in expected income and payment flows should be subject to provisions. 
An alternative approach for counter-cyclical bank regulation through provisions is 
via capital. Here, Goodhart and Persaud (2008) have presented a very specific proposal: 
increasing Basle II capital requirements by a ratio linked to recent growth of total banks’ 
assets. This provides a clear and simple rule for introducing counter-cyclicality into 
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regulation of banks. Another virtue of this proposal is that it could be fairly easily 
implemented, in that it builds on Basle II. 
If such a rule is introduced, it is important that it is simple and done in ways that 
regulators cannot loosen them easily, to avoid them becoming “captured” by the general 
over-enthusiasm that characterizes booms. 
Two issues arise. Should the focus just be on increase in total bank assets, or –as 
suggested above— should there also be some weighting for excessive growth of bank 
lending in specific sectors that have grown particularly rapidly (such as recently loans to 
real estate)? Often crises have arisen due to excessive lending during boom times to 
particular sectors or group of countries. However, most systemic bank failures have also 
been preceded by excessive growth of total bank assets. 
Finally, there is the crucial issue of timing. It seems key to approve such changes 
soon, while the appetite for regulatory reform remains high. However, their introduction 
should be done with a lag, so as to avoid increased capital requirements putting pressure 
on currently weak banks and accentuating the credit crunch.  Indeed, leverage had to be 
reduced, but this needs to be done gradually. 
Some of the least regulated parts of the financial system may have some of the 
strongest pro-cyclical impacts, including on emerging economies. One such example is 
the role that hedge funds and derivatives play in carry trade. There is increasing empirical 
evidence that such carry trade has very pro-cyclical effects (over or under-shooting) on 
the exchange rates of both developed and developing economies, with negative effects 
often on the real economy. 
For regulation to be comprehensive, as argued above, there should be minimum 
capital requirements for all derivatives dealers and minimum collateral requirements for 
all derivatives transactions, so as to reduce leverage and lower systemic risk. Collateral 
requirements for financial transactions function much like capital requirements for banks. 
An issue to explore is whether regulation of derivatives’ collateral and capital 
requirements should also have counter-cyclical elements. This would seem desirable. It 
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would imply that when derivatives positions, either long or short, were growing 
excessively (for example, well beyond historical averages), collateral and capital 
requirements could be increased. 
In addition, prudential regulation needs to ensure adequate levels of liquidity for 
financial intermediaries so that they can handle the mismatch between the average 
maturities of assets and liabilities, which is inherent in the financial system’s essential 
function of transforming maturities, and which generates risks. The best system could be 
one in which liquidity  requirements are estimated on the basis of the residual maturity of 
financial institutions’ liabilities, thus generating a direct incentive for the financial system 
to maintain an appropriate liability structure. 
Evaluating the vulnerability of domestic financial system and developing 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks have become essential elements of financial 
sector assessments undertaken by the IMF and the World Bank.  It is essential that the 
macroeconomic and, particularly the counter-cyclical dimensions of prudential regulation 
and supervision, be equally and routinely incorporated in such assessments and advice. 
C. Currency mismatches and capital account regulations 
In developing countries these counter-cyclical measures should be supplemented 
by more specific regulations aimed at controlling currency mismatches (including those 
associated with derivative operations). The strict prohibition of currency mismatches in 
the portfolios of financial intermediaries is probably the best rule. Authorities should also 
closely monitor the currency risk of non-financial firms operating in non-tradable sectors, 
which may eventually become credit risks for banks. Regulations can be used to establish 
more stringent provisions and/or risk weighting (and therefore higher capital 
requirements) for these operations, or a strict prohibition on lending in foreign currencies 
to non-financial firms and households without revenues in those currencies. 
In a complementary way, and as long as there is no international lender of last 
resort, international rules should continue to provide room for the use of capital account 
regulation by developing countries. Capital account regulations can play in fact a dual 
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role. They can be used as a complementary tool of macroeconomic policy. But they can 
also help to improve debt profiles, and in this way reduce the risks associated with 
liability structures that are biased towards short-term capital flows. 
Viewed as a liability policy, which is also relevant for prudential supervision, 
capital-account regulations recognize the fact that the market rewards sound external debt 
profiles (Rodrik and Velasco, 2000). This reflects the fact that, during times of 
uncertainty, the market responds to gross rather than merely net financing requirements, 
which means that the rollover of short-term liabilities is not financially neutral. Under 
these circumstances, a maturity profile that leans towards longer-term obligations will 
reduce domestic liquidity risks. The emphasis on liability structures rather than national 
balance sheets recognizes the fact that, together with liquid assets (particularly 
international reserves), the liability structures play the crucial role when countries face 
liquidity constraints. 
In practice, capital market regulations segment domestic and international 
markets. Traditional “quantity” controls of the type used in China and India (but being 
gradually dismantled in these countries, as in others before) distinguish between residents 
and non-residents, and between corporate and non-corporate agents among the former. 
Prohibitions or ceilings may be imposed on foreign borrowing by domestic residents, 
and/or on foreign investors taking positions in domestic securities. There may be 
limitations on various forms of lending and borrowing in foreign currency by banks. 
Another option is to introduce price-based regulations that effectively tax inflows 
or outflows. Taxing inflows was the choice pioneered by Chile in 1991 and Colombia in 
1993 (where it was then applied more aggressively, and was applied again in 2006), using 
the mechanism of unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs) on capital inflows. 
Argentina and Thailand have also used this approach in recent years, and taxing financial 
(including external) transactions has been common in Brazil. Taxing outflows was 
introduced by Malaysia in February 1999 as a substitute for the quantitative regulations it 
had introduced in 1998. The basic advantage of price-based over traditional regulations is 
their non-discretionary character. 
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A large literature on these experiences leads to four main conclusions (Ocampo, 
2008; see also Ariyoshi et al., 2000). First, controls on both inflows and outflows can 
work, but the authorities must be able to administer regulation while closing loopholes 
and (especially) avoiding corruption. Permanent regulatory regimes that can be tightened 
or loosened in response to external market conditions are probably the best option in this 
regard. Second, exchange controls and quantitative restrictions may be the best means to 
reduce the domestic sensitivity to global financial cycles, as reflected in China’s and 
India’s avoidance of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. URRs and similar measures may 
only have temporary effects on capital inflows (especially if they are not ratcheted up 
during a surge) but do seem to influence interest rate spreads. Third, URRs and other 
reserve requirements help hold down short-term debt, which is highly volatile and thus a 
significant source of vulnerability. Fourth, and perhaps foremost, controls are a 
complement for sound macroeconomic policies, not a substitute for them.  
Capital controls obviously have costs. During surges, they increase the cost of 
financing, but that should not be seen as a drawback, because this is precisely what they 
are supposed to do. Longer term costs are more important. In this regard, they can 
discourage operations by foreign institutional investors who may act as market makers 
for domestic bond and stock markets. Ways of avoiding this trade-offs between the short-
term effectiveness of capital controls and their possibly unfavorable long-term 
repercussions on financial development are not simple. 
Despite their advantages, capital account regulations were not widely used during 
the boom in the early to mid 2000s. The trend continued to be towards capital account 
liberalization, reflected in particular in the gradual liberalization in China and India. The 
moves to introduce URRs by Argentina, Colombia and Thailand led then to rejection by 
financial markets; their lead was not followed. Some countries introduced other 
regulations, particularly on purchase of domestic currency government bonds by 
international institutional investors. Other liability policies in developing countries played 
an important role in recent years, particularly prudential instruments aimed at mitigating 
currency mismatches and active liability management by public sectors. Since capital 
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flows again surged in 2010, a number of developing countries have introduced measures 
to discourage capital inflows through regulations on their capital account. 
D. Regulating compensation of bankers 
Another complementary way to discourage counter-cyclicality is to regulate 
compensation of bankers and other market actors. 
As Stiglitz (2010) points out, incentives are at the heart of the boom-bust behavior 
of financial and banking markets. A large part of bonuses were tied to short-term profits; 
these are positive in good times and never negative, even when big losses occur. This 
encourages bankers and fund managers to take a lot of risk in boom times which results 
in high bonuses for them. However, they will not lose money if heavy losses are incurred 
later due to their excessive risk-taking. 
In good times, profits are not used to increase the capital of the financial 
institutions and a large proportion are paid out as bonuses. When a crisis comes, bail-outs 
occur usually to help re-capitalize the banks, ultimately paid by the tax-payers. It can be 
argued that taxpayers are paying ex-post for excessive bonuses. 
A political point can be made in that high bonuses and high remunerations 
contribute to great wealth concentration. As a consequence, financial actors gain political 
influence, for example by financing political campaigns. The increased wealth and 
influence of the financial industry also may increase the risk that their regulators become 
captured. 
There could be a simple solution to this problem. Bonuses could be accumulated 
into an escrow account; they could be cashed only after a period equal to an average full 
cycle of economic activity, if the activity it is compensating remains profitable. Such a 
change would reduce existing incentives towards short-termism. 
Individual firms or the financial industry could introduce such changes, as 
stability is in their own long term interest. However, collective action problems make this 
highly unlikely. As a consequence, outside regulation of compensation schemes may be 
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the best way forward, even from the perspective of the stability of individual financial 
institutions, but particularly beneficial for systemic financial and macro-economic 
stability. Since the crisis, steps have been taken to regulate bonuses, but these have been 
relatively timid and have not been properly coordinated internationally. 
III. BETTER CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
A. The provision of counter-cyclical official liquidity by IMF lending 
As was pointed out in the first section of this paper, a critical role of international 
financial institutions is to mitigate the effects of financial markets and to open policy 
space for counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. A key mechanism for this purpose is 
the provision of loans by the IMF to deal with external shocks.   
1. For capital-account led crises: the long road to an appropriate facility 
At the country level, central banks have acted for many decades as lenders of last 
resort to prevent financial crises and their deepening when they occur. Equivalent 
international mechanisms are still at a fairly embryonic stage, with the current IMF 
arrangements operating, until recently, more under the principle of the “emergency 
financier,” since there was no automaticity in the availability of financing during crises. 
Enhanced provision of emergency financing at the international level in response to 
external shocks is essential to lowering unnecessary burdens of adjustment and to avoid 
the spread of crises. Appropriate facilities should include both a liquidity provision to 
cover large capital flow reversals and to compensate for volatility in the real capacity to 
import, either due to fluctuations in export or import prices. As we will see below, there 
seems to be more progress recently on the former than the latter. 
In recent decades, capital-account liberalization and large capital-account 
volatility greatly increased the need for official liquidity to deal with large reversals in 
capital flows, especially during crises. There is increasing consensus that many of the 
recent crises in emerging markets have been triggered by the self-fulfilling liquidity runs.  
Indeed, capital outflows could be provoked by many factors not related to a country’s 
policies, as is illustrated by the current global crisis. 
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The enhanced provision of emergency financing in the face of capital-account 
crises is thus important not only to manage crises when they occur, but also to prevent 
such crises and avert contagion (Cordella and Yeyati, 2005; Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 
2003). To address this obvious need, the IMF has made efforts to improve its lending 
policies during capital-account crises.  In 1997, the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) 
was established (this facility was, however, eliminated in March 2009 as part of a broader 
set of reforms discussed below).   
The evidence that even countries with good macroeconomic fundamentals might 
be subject to sudden stops of external financing also gave broad support to the idea that a 
precautionary financial arrangement, closer to the lender-of-last-resort functions of 
central banks, had to be added to existing IMF facilities. In 1999, the IMF introduced the 
Contingent Credit Line (CCL). The facility was never used and was discontinued in 
November 2003. Among the factors that may have contributed to the fact that countries 
failed to use it, observers have emphasized “entry” and “exit” problems (Buira, 2005). 
Contrary to what was desired, the potential use of the CCL was seen as an announcement 
of vulnerability that could harm confidence. 
Since the expiration of the CCL, the IMF explored other ways to achieve its 
objectives. As it recognized, the instant liquidity provided by a well-designed 
contingency line “would place a ceiling on rollover costs –thus avoiding debt crises 
triggered by unsustainable refinancing rates, much in the same way as central banks 
operate in their role as lenders of last resort” (IMF 2005b). The Medium-Term Strategy 
of the IMF (IMF 2005a) thus included a provision for a continued dialogue on a 
mechanism of contingency financing. A first proposal on a “Reserve Augmentation Line” 
(RAL) was put forward in 2006. This line would have reached 300 percent of quota. It 
required prequalification, made at the country’s request, which would have allowed the 
country to use resources automatically when needed. Some developing countries 
expressed that the RAL would have to be improved. The IMF never approved it. 
At the 2008 IMF-World Bank meetings, the G-24 called on the IMF to create a 
new liquidity instrument with the aim of mitigating vulnerability of developing countries 
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to the global financial crisis. In response, the IMF established the short-term liquidity 
facility (SLF) in October 2008. The SLF provided rapid access to loans for countries that 
have sound macroeconomic policies but yet were still facing liquidity issues due to the 
global economic climate. These loans were to be disbursed without the traditional IMF 
ex-post conditionality attached, though Managing Director Strauss-Kahn stressed that 
borrowers would be expected to maintain a sound macroeconomic policy framework. 
Loans via the SLF had a three-month maturity; borrowing limits were up to 500 percent 
of a country’s quota. The only concrete stipulation was that the borrower’s previous 
Article IV Consultation had been positive. The IMF’s actions were welcomed as a first 
step toward a more desirable facility. 
Yet, as the global crisis deepened and spread through emerging markets and into 
developing economies, no country called upon the SLF. An IMF program free of 
conditionality has been on the reform agenda of economists and policy makers since the 
structural adjustment programs failed in Latin America in the 1980s and again in East 
Asia in the 1990s (see, for example, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2008). Why, then, was 
the SLF not tapped?  
As John Williamson (2009) points out, the SLF was “useful, but it at best can help 
a limited number of countries.” Because of the preconditions imposed, eligibility was 
more restricted than was hoped by the G-24 and other proponents. Many, such as 
UNDP’s Administrator Kemal Dervis (2008), also expressed concern that programs such 
as the SLF effectively create two groups of countries: those deemed by the IMF and 
wealthy countries as having solid macroeconomic foundations and those who do not. In 
calling for expanding access to the SLF, he stated that such an “all or nothing 
categorization will create serious political tensions… [and] will also make it politically 
difficult for these governments [who are left out] to engage in such negotiations if other 
countries have immediate access to assistance from the IMF or Central Bank swaps.” 
These fears were correctly set out. For instance, when speaking of Argentina’s lack of a 
recent Article IV Consultation, Managing Director Strauss-Kahn stated: “I'm afraid that 
the country you've just mentioned … will not be eligible for this facility.” 
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It is probable that the handful of countries eligible for the SLF were those who 
were least in need of loans from the IMF. Instead, they were able to raise the requisite 
capital through private or bilateral sources. The same day that the IMF announced the 
creation of the SLF, the US Federal Reserve finalized reciprocal currency arrangements 
with Mexico, The Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Brazil –four countries which would 
have most likely qualified for IMF loans under the SLF. These swap lines had limits of 
up to $30 billion and expired in October 2009. 
Mexico publicly stated that it had no plans of ever using the SLF, though it 
welcomed its establishment as a “potentially useful tool for countries with strong policy 
records.” When the SLF was replaced by the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), Mexico became 
the first country to use the new facility with a precautionary arrangement of $47 billion, 
which it did on the eve of the G-20 meetings in London. Two days later, Banco de 
México announced that it would activate its $30 billion swap line with the Fed. Mexico 
supplemented its dollars from the Fed with a precautionary line of credit from the IMF.  
In recognition of SLF inadequacies, in March 2009, the IMF Executive Board 
voted to replace it with the FCL. At the same time, the IMF announced a range of other 
measures, such as modernizing conditionality, enhancing stand-by arrangements, and 
doubling access limits for non-concessional loans. Like the SLF, the FCL is based on ex-
ante qualifications of sound economic policies and contains no ex-post conditionality. 
The FCL directly addressed the noted shortfalls of the SLF: It is a renewable credit line 
(either at six or twelve-month periods), has no borrowing limit, allows borrowers to draw 
at any time or use it as a precautionary instrument, and has a longer repayment period of 
three to five years. The IMF stressed that the pre-set qualification criteria are at the core 
of the FCL. When used as a precautionary tool, the FCL is intended to bolster confidence 
and prevent crisis situations. Though there seems to be greater flexibility, the FCL is still 
for “countries with very strong fundamentals and track records of policy 
implementation”. 
Many policy makers, especially those in large emerging markets, welcomed the 
FCL as a marked improvement over the SLF: Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, 
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said “This way, the IMF can react quicker.” South Africa’s finance minister, Trevor 
Manuel, said: “At a time when the global economy is experiencing the deepest and most 
widespread crisis in recent history, this facility, together with increased lending access 
limits and simplified terms for borrowing, will enable the IMF to better respond to the 
various needs of all member countries”. 
Positive reception, however, was not universal. Both South Korea and Singapore 
announced they were not interested in pursuing an IMF loan, even with the modified 
facility. Although welcoming modifications made by the IMF, Brazilian President Lula 
made it quite clear that “Brazil needs no money from the IMF”. These statements point to 
the Fund’s more serious, and much more difficult to tackle, problem: stigma. Still feeling 
the effects of the IMF response to the Latin American and Asian financial crises, these 
countries were refusing to turn to the IMF. Eswar Prasad, formerly at the IMF, noted this 
“The main emerging markets are going to remain wary of relying on the IMF for 
emergency financial support until they are convinced that the leopard has really changed 
its spots.” Mexico’s April  2009, announcement of its intention to seek a $47 billion loan 
from the FCL to help it weather the effects of the financial crisis was seem as helping 
address the stigma. In doing so, Finance Minister Agustin Carstens reiterated that Mexico 
had no need or intention to actually draw on the credit line, but was looking to it for 
precautionary measures –exactly as the IMF had intended, and as those advocating such a 
contingent preventive credit line had suggested for a long time. Two weeks later, Poland 
followed with a $20.5 billion request for a precautionary credit line, as did Colombia with 
a $10.4 billion request. The terms of the FCL were improved in August 2010, by 
increasing the scale of the resources and extending the period for which it can be used, but 
these have been the only three countries using it so far. 
It should be added that in March 2009, although some existing facility were 
eliminated (particularly the SRF and, as we will see, the Compensatory Financing Facility, 
CFF), credits under the Stand-by facility were doubled and countries were allowed to use it 
for preventive purposes (termed ‘high-access precautionary arrangements’). In August 
2010, an additional step was taken, with the creation of the new Precautionary Credit 
Line (PCL) for countries which the IMF deems have good policies, but that do not meet 
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the criteria of the FCL. All these facilities have been more broadly used. The other 
significant reform introduced in March 2009 was the elimination of the relationship 
between IMF disbursements and structural conditionality. 
2. Compensatory financing for low-income countries 
The international community has a clear incentive to protect emerging markets 
and low-income countries from the adverse effects of external shocks. As evidenced by 
the current crisis, external shocks add to global instability by eliminating export markets 
and increasing the need for foreign aid. For individual countries, unnecessary reductions 
of imports in the face of temporary shocks is highly undesirable, from the perspective of 
sacrificing growth and poverty reduction, that could be avoided if financing is provided. 
It was, therefore, disappointing that, when announcing the FCL, the Compensatory 
Financing Facility (CFF) for middle income countries was cancelled, instead of 
correcting its basic deficiency: excessive conditionality. 
Created in 1963, and modified many times since, the CFF addressed members’ 
balance of payments problems arising from temporary export shortfalls and significant 
increases in cereal imports, beyond the member’s control. Adjustments to the CFF in 
2000 simplified access limits, but, more notably, increased the level of conditionality 
associated with borrowing, to make it as stringent as an upper credit tranche loan. A Fund 
review of the facility in 2004 revealed that, despite external shocks to many economies as 
a result of the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and a drastic 
reduction in cereal production in southern Africa, no country had borrowed from the CFF 
since these modifications had been made. Such a fact stands in stark contrast to the forty-
two loans that had been made in the 1990s under this facility. As will be discussed in 
more detail below, by definition, exogenous shocks are not the fault of the country in 
question and therefore loans to those countries should not carry any conditionality. 
Arguing that the facility had not been used since 2000, that the question of 
temporality is often difficult to assess, the Executive Board eliminated the CFF as a 
lending option in March 2009. 
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The IMF’s main instrument for addressing the needs of low-income countries was 
for a long time the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Since the creation of 
the PRGF in 1999, augmented PRGF arrangements first became the vehicle the Fund has 
used to provide financing for low-income countries that are suffering from exogenous 
shocks. This mechanism had the main advantage that financing was concessional. Yet, 
this mechanism had a number of problems. First, it was restricted to only some low 
income countries, those with PRGF programs. Consequently, it was linked to a high 
conditionality Fund arrangement, inappropriate as terms of trade shocks are caused by 
external circumstances. Secondly, as the Fund itself recognized (IMF, 2005a), PRGF 
average augmentation was very small compared to the impact of the shock. 2008 saw a 
marked increase in the number of countries requesting augmentations to their existing 
PRGF arrangements; most of these countries sought this additional financing in an effort 
to mitigate the adverse effects of the global increase in food and energy prices (see Table 
1) though as the global crisis hit, it was also used to compensate for its effects, though the 
scale was small.  
    Table 1
 Augmentation of the IMF' PRGF, 2004-2008
Date Country PRGF type
Amount 
(millions SDR) Reason
Jul-04 Bangladesh Augmentation 53.3
Associated with first approval of under newly created Trade Integration
Mechanism
Dec-04 Kenya Augmentation 50 Rising oil prices and drought
Dec-04 Azerbaijan Reduction 12.9 Cancellation of one review
Nov-05 Niger Augmentation 19.7 Severe drought and terms of trade deterioration
Sep-06 Burkina Faso Augmentation 6 Decline in terms of trade
Dec-06 Moldova Augmentation 30.8
Sharp increase in natural gas import prices and disruptions in wine exports to
traditional markets
Apr-07 Kenya Reduction 75 Improved external position
Jan-08 Burkina Faso Augmentation 9 Expected decline in cotton exports and rise in oil imports.
May-08 Kyrgyz Republic Augmentation 8.9 Mitigate effects of rising food and energy prices.
Jun-08 Central African Republic Augmentation 8.355 Mitigate effects of rising food and energy prices.
Jul-08 Madagascar Augmentation 18.33 Rising food and oil prices, as well as the impact of cyclones.
Jul-08 Grenada Augmentation 1.46 Mitigate effects of rising food and energy prices.
Sep-08 Togo Augmentation 18.35 Rising food and oil prices as well as severe flooding
Dec-08 Sierra Leone Augmentation 10.4
Strengthen the foreign reserve position to cope with the external shocks from
world food and fuel price increases and the unfolding global financial crisis
Dec-08 Benin Augmentation 23.22 Mitigate effects of rising food and energy prices.
Feb-09 The Gambia Augmentation 6.215
International reserves declining and the current account deficit widening as a result
primarily of reduced income from tourism and remittances.  
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The IMF’s Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) was established within the PRGF 
Trust in November 2005 to provide financing and policy support to low-income countries 
facing exogenous shocks. The ESF was for countries eligible for the PRGF, but did not 
have a program in place. For the first three years of its existence, the ESF had no 
borrowers. In postulating why this was the case, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2008) cite 
the major shortfalls of the ESF as: (i) the slow pace of disbursement, which did not allow 
countries to react to crises in a timely manner; (ii) the small scale of liquidity provided, as 
countries were only allowed to borrow 25 percent of the quota annually and 50 percent 
for the facility as a whole, which, in most cases, was not enough to counteract an 
unanticipated shock; the small scale of the compensatory financing for trade shocks was 
also a major problem of the Enhancements of the PRGF; and (iii) the tying of the loan to 
the Poverty Support Instrument (PSI), which has a conditionality of its own, in addition 
to that imposed by the ESF. Countries without a PSI needed an approved poverty 
reduction strategy. Given the shock was exogenous, by definition, all this conditionality 
was inappropriate. 
The Executive Board of the IMF sought to improve upon the facility. A group of 
international NGOs,2 pressed the IMF to adjust the ESF to better respond to the needs of 
low-income countries, particularly in the face of food and energy price increases that 
occurred in the summer of 2008. Their main concern was the fact that if shocks are 
exogenous, conditionality is inappropriate. This coincided with the views expressed by 
Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2008). 
The IMF Executive Board approved fairly significant adjustments to the ESF in 
September 2008. The modification to the ESF had two main parts: a rapid-access 
component and a high-access component. First, it allowed countries to access the ESF 
loans fairly quickly, up to 25 percent of its quota for each exogenous shock (IMF 2008). 
This loan could stand alone, or be part of a larger package. The second component 
increased the borrowing limit to 75 percent of quota for each arrangement. One or two 
year programs were established, and finances disbursed upon review. In addition, the 
                                                 
2 The full list of NGOs signing the document is: Action Aid International, African Network on Debt and 
Development, Bank Information Center (US), Bretton Woods Project (U.K.), European Network on Debt 
and Development, New Rules of Global Finance Coalition, US, and Oxfam International.  
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IMF dropped the requirement to have an approved Poverty Reduction Strategy and 
streamlined conditionality under the rapid-access component, (IMF 2008). However, the 
high access component still had inappropriately high conditionality. Perhaps most 
importantly, the limit of 75 percent of quota was very limited, especially in a context of 
very large declines of commodity prices, as during the crisis. Since these changes took 
effect, several countries drew on the facility; the fact that the global crisis had hit low 
income countries hard via the trade, (especially commodity price) channel was naturally 
an important factor 
In April 2009, the IMF doubled access to all its low income facilities, including 
the ESF. It also increased the global capacity of IMF loans to these countries to $17 
billion. Though this was very positive, it may have been still insufficient, given the scale 
of the shocks facing low income countries in a world that is increasingly volatile due both 
to frequent financial crises and growing natural disasters linked to climate change. More 
broadly, the question arises why limits are so much lower for low income than middle 
income countries. 
In March and especially December 2009, the IMF modified quite significantly the 
lending facilities through which it lends to low income countries, which is now done 
through three facilities: (i) The Extended Credit Facility (ECF), which replaced the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth facility (PRGF). (ii) A stand-by line, which can either be 
used for larger external shocks (that used to be addressed by special facilities, like the 
ESF for low income countries) or other balance of payments needs linked to domestic 
policy problems. From our perspective, this particular change is inappropriate, as balance 
of payments needs arising from external shocks should be clearly distinguished from 
those caused by domestic policy mistakes; the former should, above all, have lower, or 
ideally no conditionality. And (iii) a Rapid Credit Facility (RCF), which provides limited 
support during for balance of payments needs either due to natural disasters or a trade 
shock, with relatively low conditionality. This is a useful quick disbursing facility, but its 
scale is too small. A positive change was that the IMF granted all low income countries 
an exceptional cancellation of all owed interest payments on concessional loans until the 
end of 2011, as well as lower interest rates on future loans. 
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The history of the last 15 years shows that the IMF has played a positive role as a 
last resort lender, but it needs to be more active in awarding larger emergency financing 
subject to lower levels of conditionality. It needs to continue to improve its design of 
mechanisms with sufficient resources, preferably that are automatic and speedy, so as to 
deal with shocks that developing countries face, both  those coming from the capital 
account, that affects mainly middle income countries, and the trade shocks that low 
income countries face. 
3. Conditionality 
As important as the lending facilities of IMF is the conditionality attached to 
them. Conditionality in IMF-supported programs had been introduced in the 1950s and 
incorporated as a requirement into the Articles of Agreement in 1969. Until the 1980s, 
conditionality mainly focused on monetary, fiscal, and exchange-rate policies. However, 
in the late 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, in addition to traditional quantitative targets 
for macroeconomic variables, IMF financing was increasingly conditional on structural 
changes, involving changes in policy processes, legislation, and institutional reforms. 
This resulted in a significant increase in the average number of structural conditions in 
Fund-supported programs. These climbed from 2-3 per year per program in the mid-
1980s to 12 or more per year per program by the second half of the 1990s, and to as high 
as 117 in the case of Indonesia after its financial crisis in 1997 (International Monetary 
Fund, 2003b). This change was also reflected in increasing numbers of performance 
criteria, structural benchmarks and prior actions. 
The increase in the number of structural conditions raised concerns that IMF was 
exceeding its mandate and expertise. It has also been argued that the number and detail of 
structural policy conditions attached to IMF loans were too extensive to be fully effective 
(United Nations, 2001). In this regard, it has been observed that the rate of member 
countries’ compliance with Fund-supported programs fell from over 50 percent in the late 
1970s and early 1980s to about 16 percent in the 1990s, if compliance is defined as that 
which permitted the full disbursement of the loan (Buira, 2003). 
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There were also concerns that excessive conditionality might have undermined 
the national ownership of programs, thereby impeding their implementation. Indeed, 
following closely the arguments related to external assistance in general, it has become 
clear that lack of real domestic ownership is the most important obstacle to effective 
program implementation, and that conditionality is not a substitute for government 
commitment. In this regard, it has also been argued that “ownership” can be promoted 
only by an effective plural discussion of the virtues of alternative types of “structural 
reforms” (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2003). 
Against the backdrop of continuing debate over the use and effectiveness of 
structural conditions, in early 2008, the Independent Evaluation Office published an 
evaluation of the use of structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs. It focused 
on two distinct issues: the effectiveness of structural conditionality at bringing about 
lasting economic change and the impact of the 2000 Streamlining Initiative to achieve 
greater focus in the use of conditionality in Fund arrangements. 
The report found that a significant number of structural conditions are very 
detailed, not obviously critical, and are often felt to be intrusive and to undermine 
domestic ownership of programs. Most programs failed to explain how so many 
conditions at such a level of detail are needed to bring about the desired long-lasting 
reforms. The report also found that compliance with structural conditionality, at about 50 
percent, is low compared to about 85 percent for macroeconomic conditionality. In these 
circumstances, it is difficult to see how structural conditionality contributes to ensuring 
adequate safeguards for the use of Fund resources or how it provides assurances to 
borrowing countries regarding the conditions under which Fund resources would be 
available to them –the roles envisaged for conditionality in the Fund’s Articles of 
Agreement. 
The evaluation found that the average number of structural conditions in IMF-
supported programs had not declined since the launching of the streamlining initiative in 
2000. However, progress has been made in that the composition of structural 
conditionality has changed, showing a significant shift toward core areas of IMF 
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expertise, with marked declines in the share of conditions in trade and privatization and 
increases in tax policy, public expenditure management and financial sector issues. Yet, 
about one-third of structural conditions continue to fall in non-core areas. Improving the 
design of structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs remains a key challenge 
for the Fund. 
Recommendations from the IMF Evaluation Office included reaffirming the need 
to reduce the volume of structural conditionality. As a practical first step, a notional cap 
could be set, possibly at four or five conditions per year –half the current average for 
performance criteria and prior actions.  We also believe that any conditionality should be 
restricted to core IMF issues. 
It is important to clarify the link between structural features and macroeconomic 
policies. Structural macroeconomic balances can be produced, and in fact have been 
produced in the past, in economies with high degrees of public sector intervention. Also, 
considerable academic debate still goes on as to whether more liberalized economies are 
superior in terms of their resilience, their efficiency and their ability to grow. We have 
growing evidence that vulnerability may, in fact, increase with liberalization, particularly 
vulnerability to capital account shocks. Without adequate correction for market failures, 
efficiency is not guaranteed, and liberalized economies do not necessarily grow faster. A 
well-known paper by Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) made this point clear: 
macroeconomic stability is essential for growth but more liberalized economies 
(particularly in relation to trade) do not necessarily grow faster. 
This implies that “ownership” requires meeting several additional conditions: 
effective alternative reform packages should be available to countries; such alternatives 
should be provided by the Bretton Woods institutions with the same technical rigor as 
traditional reform programs; these institutions should be ready to provide such support 
when asked to do so; but for this, the composition of IMF (and World Bank) staff should 
be representative of the heterogeneous views that exist on structural and macroeconomic 
adjustment. In a complementary way, these institutions should be ready to call 
organizations or economists who think differently to support the design of alternative 
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programs. This clearly means that IMF conditionality should be restricted to 
macroeconomic policies, and that a strong negative presumption should be established 
against any form of structural conditionality that goes beyond factors that directly hinge 
on macroeconomic balances. 
It must said finally on this issue that one positive recent change in conditionality 
is that implementation of structural policies in IMF programs will be monitored in the 
context of program reviews rather than through the use of structural performance criteria. 
According to IMF, this means that countries will no longer need formal waivers if they 
fail to meet a structural reform by a particular date. Though positive, however, it is not 
clear why structural reforms need to continue to be part of IMF programs 
4. Increasing Fund resources 
As the realities of the current crisis began to settle in, an increasing number of 
countries turned to the IMF in the face of balance of payments problems. This sparked a 
concern that the current lending capacity of the Fund would prove to be inadequate given 
the expected magnitude of the crisis. Developing countries and many other observers 
have, for some time, emphasized the limitation of Fund resources. Indeed, the size of the 
Fund has shrunk relative to the world economy over the past thirty years, particularly in 
relation to trade and cross-border capital flows (IMF, 2009a). 
At the start of 2009, the IMF contended that it had the funds to meet the 
foreseeable demands, but that it would also be “prudent...to add contingent facilities that 
would double the resources available”. Various proposals to significantly increase Fund 
resources were endorsed by the G-20 in spring 2009, and included a new allocation of 
special-drawing rights (SDR) equivalent to $250 billion, which was a very significant 
amount; loans from countries that currently have a surplus of reserves; increasing IMF 
members’ quotas; and sales of IMF gold resources. Section IV focuses on the first of 
these issues, so we will concentrate here on the others.  
 37
The most important commitment in terms of boosting the financing for IMF credit 
lines was the mix of $250 billion in immediate bilateral financing and an additional $250 
billion through a revamped New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB).  
Increasing members’ quotas has been the traditional means of replenishing the 
Fund. The G20 agreed to accelerate the next quota review to January 2011. While this is 
a marked improvement over its previously scheduled date, it is short of the April 2010 
date requested by the Committee on IMF Governance Reform headed by Trevor Manuel 
(IMF, 2009a). Given important demands on Fund resources a major increase in quotas 
may be needed. 
The use of arrangements to borrow as the way to provide the resources for IMF 
finance emergency financing has the basic disadvantaged that it is not truly multilateral 
and gives a disproportionate influence to those countries providing funds. It also 
generates uncertainty as to the funds available to the IMF for its operations. Quota 
increases are better in this regard, but have the major problem that only about 30% are 
available for new lending (Polak, 2005, ch. 7). For these reasons, as argued below, an 
SDR-based IMF is the best option. 
We will discuss below (in Section IV) in greater depth, a major reform of the 
global monetary system that would have at its center an SDR-based IMF. We will argue 
there that this way of financing the Fund is clearly superior to both arrangements to 
borrow, in their different modalities, and even to quota increases.  
B. Creation of an International Debt Workout Mechanism 
As it is widely accepted, and even beyond the traditional trade-off between 
financing and adjustment in the face of balance of payments crises, the global financial 
architecture cannot rely exclusively on emergency lending (or “bailouts”, as they are 
generally called) for two major reasons, which can be seen as the two sides of the same 
coin. The first is that it may result in unsustainable levels of foreign indebtedness. The 
second is that it may generate moral hazard for creditors. For these reasons, an 
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international financial architecture must have complementary mechanisms to finance 
emergencies and debt workouts to manage debt crises. 
The dividing line between when to use one or the other has been traditionally set 
as that between “liquidity” and “solvency”, but as we know this line is not easy to draw, 
as in many cases the lack of liquidity financing may lead into insolvency (we could add 
that this is true at the level of firms as well as nations). The Bretton Woods arrangements 
had another dividing line: only current account deficits should be financed, whereas 
capital account deficits should be managed with capital controls. Some authors have 
suggested going back indeed to this dividing line (Akyüz, 2005), but it may be too late 
for that purpose. In a world with large pro-cyclical capital flows, it is inevitable that there 
should be some financing of capital account, not only current account deficits. Capital 
controls can also play a central role in this regard, as discussed above. 
In the discussions that were launched by the Asian crisis, most of the abundant 
reports and academic contributions demanded that the system should both provide more 
liquidity financing during capital account crises and a framework for the resolution of 
debt crises. Indeed, this is the way national systems are designed: they include both 
“lender of last resort” financing (and some bailouts of non-financial firms through 
government interventions of different sorts) and bankruptcy procedures. National 
bankruptcy frameworks are not only intended to give the debtor a “fresh start” and treat 
debtors and creditors fairly, but also promote efficiency by creating incentives for 
creditors to undertake due diligence in lending—ensuring that they lend to people who 
can pay back what is borrowed. The basic reason for rescuing firms is that bankruptcy 
generates a significant loss of capital, not only because capital equipment and even real 
estate owned by firms are sold at very low prices, but also because the “intangible 
capital” of the firm (its reputation, administrative traditions and networks of clients) is 
entirely destroyed. The reasons for rescuing countries are even more powerful but the 
instruments must be different. 
Before the Second World War, the normal way to manage sovereign debt defaults 
at the international level was through inter-governmental arbitration. Creditors were 
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organized in committees which tried to negotiate directly with the country in default. 
When they failed, they sought assistance from their own governments. (It must be added 
that, in some cases, and up to the early twentieth century, they went so far as to intervene 
militarily in the debtor country.) Government facilitation was still the mechanism used in 
the early post-war period to settle the debts which had gone into default in the 1930s. 
After the War, the only regular mechanism that was put in place on a regular basis was 
the Paris Club, born in the mid-1950s to manage official debts. Official ad-hoc initiatives 
also include the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative launched in 1996 and 
the succeeding Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) of 2005. In the case of private 
debts, the Brady Plan was a late but important part of the process of overcoming the Latin 
American debt crisis, and interventions by industrial countries’ governments and central 
banks were common to twist the arms of private creditors to maintain short-term 
financing lines and rollover credits during the Asian crisis. 
The remaining mechanisms were ad-hoc in nature. They include, the “London 
clubs” to renegotiate bank debts, which is really not a formal set up but a generic name to 
a mechanism that has a touch of the way renegotiations were done prior to the war. 
Collective action clauses (CACs) in some issues have been used for some time in some 
markets (e.g., London) to facilitate eventual renegotiations and became broadly accepted 
in recent years in others (New York) but they have not been fully tested yet. Bond swaps 
that amount to important rescheduling of debt service have been used in some cases even 
without CACs. And, of course, a few cases of unilateral default have led to (conflictive) 
settlements that have had a significant “haircut”. Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2001 
are the most important examples in that regard. 
All these mechanisms have serious deficiencies. The most important is that they 
generally come too late, when over-indebtedness has had devastating effects on countries: 
a collapse of economic activity, a long period of lost income and jobs, increased poverty 
and, in many cases, worsening income inequality. This is also true of the Paris Club, 
which has historically relied on sequential rescheduling of debts, and it is certainly true of 
the Brady Plan and HIPC. Haircuts are absent or insufficient to guarantee a fresh start, 
and thus lead to renegotiations later on. Insufficient debt reduction under the Brady Plan 
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may explain in part why several Latin American countries faced a difficult adjustment in 
the face of the Asian crisis. And it is certainly true of HIPC, which had to be 
complemented with the MDRI. In a sense, a common strategy has been simply to use 
renegotiations to postpone, not solve the problem. 
This has been particularly bad in the case of consensual, market-based private 
rescheduling. Although they are useful rollover operations to manage “bumps” in the 
debt servicing schedule, they have not contributed to solving problems of over-
indebtedness. Since swaps are voluntary, the terms on the new bonds had to be attractive 
enough to induce creditors to participate. So, as Spiegel (2010) has shown, even in cases 
when investors experienced losses over a short time period, returns to investors were 
quite good over a longer time horizon. The underlying problems could therefore resurface 
later, as the case of Ecuador show. It is, again, only in the cases of unilateral defaults that 
creditor losses are significant. 
An additional problem is that the existing system –or, rather, non-system—treats 
creditors and debtors in dissimilar ways, thus leading to horizontal inequities. Even Paris 
Club creditors have complained that private lenders do not follow the guidelines of their 
renegotiations (in which, of course, private creditors have no voice). Leaving private 
renegotiations to take the lead may be particularly unfair to debtors with weak bargaining 
power, whereas large countries (Argentina and Russia, again) may be able at the end to 
get a better deal. 
The Asian crisis led to several initiatives in this area, but no final solution was 
adopted (see a full review in Herman, Ocampo and Spiegel, 2010). The renewed capital 
account boom experienced by developing countries since 2002 till the crisis no doubt 
served to postpone the problem, which resurfaced again, in the European context, during 
the current world financial crisis. The most important initiative was undoubtedly the 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) proposed by the IMF in 2001 with 
encouragement of the US Treasury Secretary. However, it was killed in 2003 by a 
coalition made of the US Treasury itself and several emerging market governments, 
which feared that they were giving a signal to the market that they would contemplate 
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defaulting at some time in the future. The private sector also opposed it, among other 
reasons because it saw the IMF as unlikely to be a “neutral mediator”, as it was also a 
creditor. However, its main reason for opposing it seems to have been that it felt 
introducing the SDRM would weaken its bargaining position in eventual debt 
renegotiations. 
Of other initiatives, the most important, as already noticed, was the tendency to 
generalize CACs. This initiative, which had been proposed after the Mexican “Tequila” 
crisis of 1994, was finally speeded up by the private sector, largely to help kill the SDRM 
discussions. The initial fear that this would result in higher risk premium for those 
countries choosing to include this provision in their bond issues did not materialize. 
Meanwhile, a group of banks together with some major emerging countries promoted a 
code of conduct for market-based renegotiations, formally called the Principles for Stable 
Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring, which was adopted in 2004 and is promoted 
by the Institute of International Finance. There were also several other initiatives coming 
from the academic world and non-governmental organizations. NGOs have also opposed 
IMF participation in the debt resolution process, not only because their rejection to 
traditional conditionality but also because the Fund’s governance structure is today 
dominated by creditor countries. 
As part of the current debates on redesigning the world financial architecture, it is 
urgent that this debate come to conclusion, by designing a well structured sovereign debt 
workouts mechanism. The Monterrey Consensus as well as the Doha follow-up  
encourage a global decision in this area. As Herman, Ocampo and Spiegel (2010, ch. 17) 
have argued, this mechanism should be a single system for relief, which should embody 
mechanisms for debtors to talk with their creditors with the goal of reaching a timely and 
comprehensive debt restructuring that gives the debtor country a fresh start. This latter 
principle should be understood in the context of human development, thus aiming at debt 
conditions in which the burdens of adjustment do not severely affect the disadvantaged in 
society. Although the poorest countries may require special treatment to support their 
recovery after crises, this task should be left to the aid regime —i.e., to official 
development assistance. A complementary but major task of multilateral development 
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cooperation is to support countries that have undergone debt restructuring to have a 
smooth and hopefully speedy return to markets. Multilateral development banks can play 
a crucial role in this regard, through co-financing or the issue of guarantees to new debt 
issues by countries.  
Any process of this type has to start with the declaration of moratoria by the 
debtor country, which unleashes the renegotiations. As in national bankruptcy regimes, 
the first step in any renegotiation would be characterized by the attempt by the defaulting 
country to reach a voluntary agreement with creditors. The process should also serve as a 
framework to coordinate the positions of creditors within and across different classes of 
lenders (including government creditors that operate today through the Paris Club). It 
should aim at a fair deal with the debtors but also an equitable treatment of creditors, 
including minority lenders. 
The structure of the renegotiation process could follow two alternative approaches. 
The first would be an International Debt Court, created as an independent body, which 
would be in charge of the whole process. It would work first as an “honest broker”, 
encouraging but not involving itself in the debtor/creditor negotiations. But it will also be 
in charge of the arbitration, either at the request of the parties or on its own, if the 
voluntary renegotiations are unsuccessful or are delayed beyond an agreed period. The 
Court would ensure that agreed international principles of a fresh start, equitable sharing 
of haircuts and priority of claims against the debtor government are followed. As in 
national “debtor in possession financing”, it would also have the authority to ask creditors 
to provide new financing to the country undergoing debt restructuring. These new debts, 
as well as all financing provided when the country is in default (e.g., IMF “lending into 
arrears”, loans by multilateral development banks and official bilateral loans, but possibly 
also some private credits) would have seniority over defaulted debts. 
The second alternative would be to empower a global financial institution to take 
over the responsibilities of “honest broker” and eventual arbitrator. This can be a UN 
body, but also the IMF. However, as the SDRM discussions revealed, the Fund is 
unlikely to be seen as a neutral mediator. However, in this case, the mechanism could 
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function through a system of independent panels of experts, similar to those used under 
the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization. The panel would 
take the responsibility for mediating the negotiation between the debtor and its creditors 
and ultimately determine the solution, following agreed international policy guidelines. 
There can also be a mix between these two approaches. For example, the Fund or 
the independent panel could first seek to facilitate voluntary debtor/creditor negotiations 
for a limited time period, after which it would refer the case to the International Debt 
Court. It is, of course, essential, that national courts recognize the legitimacy of 
international rulings in this area, under either framework. An international treaty is 
therefore essential, and should be negotiated in the United Nations, even if this 
organization is not in charge of its functioning. Such a treaty should provide clear 
guidance as to what constitutes a “fresh start” and what is required to reach 
internationally agreed human development goals. Incorporating such considerations of 
fairness are essential to boost the credibility of any designed framework with debtors. 
Debtors will also benefit from the definition of clear rules of the game and the 
sustainability of the debt situation once the process is over in individual cases. 
It must be emphasized that the workout mechanism designed should deal 
primarily with sovereign debts, but there are two other individual cases that should be 
taken into account. They are private sector debts that are “nationalized” during crises as 
part of bailouts, particularly of financial sectors, and cases where private sector debts 
cannot be serviced because they would generate balance of payments problems. In the 
first case, the external liabilities should be treated in principle as corporate debts that 
should be renegotiated as such, as part of the cleaning of the balance sheet of the 
institution involved, and can therefore involve larger amounts of haircuts. In any case, it 
should be subject at least to the reductions of the overall public sector debt. This 
procedure would help reduce the pressure exercised by foreign creditors to take over 
private sector debts during crises, which has been a practice in many developing 
countries in the past and have added substantial amounts of private sector debt to the 
sovereign’s obligations. In the case of balance of payments crises, an agreement should 
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be reached as to how foreign creditors can convert the amounts paid in local currency 
into foreign exchange. 
IV. REFORMING THE GLOBAL RESERVE SYSTEM  
A. The problems of the system 
Discussions on the global reserve system go back to the debates that surrounded 
the creation of the International Monetary Fund as part of the preparation for a post-
Second World War order. A central concern of these proposals was the need to design 
mechanisms to avert the repetition of the collapse of the multilateral trade and payments 
mechanisms and competitive exchange depreciations among major currencies during the 
1930s. Keynes recommended the creation of a global reserve currency that would be at 
the center of a multilateral clearing mechanism. The main virtue of this proposal, in his 
view, is that it corrected the essential asymmetry of all international payments 
mechanism that had existed up to then, associated with the fact that the burden of 
adjustment falls on deficit countries, whereas surplus countries lack a similar pressure to 
adjust. 
The system designed in Bretton Woods was based on the dual use of gold and 
dollar at the center of the system and did not correct this fundamental problem. 
Furthermore, it added another one, which came to be called the “Triffin dilemma” after 
the pioneering work of the Belgian economist Robert Triffin (1961). The essential 
problem, as he pointed out, is that the use of a national currency as international 
monetary instrument creates a paradoxical situation: the build up international reserves in 
the rest of the world is only possible if the reserve currency issuing country (the United 
States) runs a balance of payments deficit, but this deficit erodes the confidence in the use 
of that currency (the US dollar) as a reserve currency. This generates an inherent 
instability of the system. 
The perspective of developing countries was largely absent in the major reform 
undertaken in the 1960s, the launching of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which 
gave birth to the first world fiduciary reserve currency. The fact that the US had an 
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“exorbitant privilege” under the system, to use de Gaulle’s terminology, was at the center 
of the call by European countries to participate in the benefits from world reserve 
creation –i.e., world seignorage). But the fact that the system also had an imbedded 
inequity, as it involved a resource transfer from developing countries to the reserve 
currency issuing country –i.e., a form of “reverse aid”—was not a central issue in the 
debate. As SDRs were allocated in proportion to IMF quotas, their share in reserve 
creation was also small. The developing countries were rather viewed by industrial 
countries as somewhat unreliable partners in global monetary reform, as they were 
perceived to want more aid, not more reserves and were thus seen as likely to spend 
whatever reserve allocation they got (see Solomon, 1977).  
Two interesting proposals were made at the time, however, which had strong 
development dimensions. The first was the proposals by a group of experts convened by 
UNCTAD to generate a “development link” in global currency allocation, through the 
possibility of allowing the IMF to invest in bonds issued by multilateral development 
banks, basically the World Bank at the time (UNCTAD, 1965). We will return to this 
issue below. The second was the possibility of creating a commodity-based reserve 
currency (a proposal that also goes back to Keynes), which had the very interesting 
feature that it tended to stabilize commodity prices at the same time. This had potentially 
very positive effects on developing countries and would also provide an automatic 
stabilizer for the world economy (see Hart et al, 1964). 
With the demise of the gold-exchange standard in the early 1970s, the world 
moved effectively into a “fiduciary dollar standard” (it is also, but only secondarily, a 
system in which alternative fiduciary currencies compete with each other for their role as 
reserve currencies). The system has had since then two major trends: (i) growing US 
current account deficits, which eroded the net investor position of the US and 
transformed it into a net debtor position; and (ii) increasingly sharp cycles in the US 
current account deficit and the real exchange rate of the US dollar (Ocampo, 2007/8 and 
2010; Ocampo, Kregel and Griffith-Jones, 2007, ch. IV). The latter can be seen as the 
particular manifestation of the Triffin dilemma under the fiduciary dollar standard. 
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The first of these phenomena has generated an abundant literature on the 
implications of an eventual run of the dollar on the global system. This expectation has 
not materialized so far and, rather, the US dollar has actually appreciated during the 
current crisis as the result of the perception that US government securities are the “safest” 
assets in the world and perhaps the lack of a large alternative supply of “safe” assets. 
Nobody can rule out, however, an eventual run on the dollar, particularly in the face of 
ballooning Fed balance sheets and US federal government debts. The second problem, 
the instability of the dollar implies that the US dollar does not have the major feature that 
a good reserve asset should have: the stability of its value. This is what was emphasized 
by the Chinese central bank governor in March 2009 (Zhou, 2009). 
The development dimensions have become even more prominent in recent 
decades as the result of the fact that developing countries have accumulated massive 
foreign exchange reserves. What this implies is that the resource transfers towards the 
reserve issuing countries have been significantly increased, thus making the inequitable 
features of the current global reserve system even more prominent. At the same time, 
however, such accumulation may have contributed to global imbalances, and in this sense 
to potential global instability –an effect that can be called the “inequity-instability link” 
(Ocampo, 2007/08 and 2010). 
The financial asymmetries that characterize the world economy imply that 
developing countries not only face strong shocks through the business cycle but also, as a 
result of pro-cyclical capital flows, reduced room of maneuver to adopt counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies. Strong shocks and pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies have 
left an inheritance of a multitude of financial, balance of payments and, frequently, a mix 
of both.  
Within the limited maneuvering room that these countries have, they have thus 
responded by trying to create their own “policy space” for counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies. Such policies are aimed either at correcting the direct source of 
the disturbance, capital account volatility (through capital account regulations) or its 
macroeconomic effects. Although there have been movements in several policy 
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directions, the most common one in recent decades has been the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves. 
The large accumulation of international reserves by developing countries is 
indeed a clear response to the very costly crises they faced in the 1980s and in late 1990s. 
Up to the 1980s, international reserves in the hands of developing countries were not very 
different from those of the industrial countries –around 3 percent of GDP. The Latin 
American debt crisis of the 1980s led both middle and low income countries to sharply 
increase the demand for reserves, which started to diverge from that of the industrial 
world since the early 1990s (Japan was the only exception among industrial countries). 
The Asian and Russian crises accelerated this trend. The most aggressive country in this 
regard was, of course, China, which by 2007 had accumulated non-gold reserves 
equivalent to 46.7 percent of its GDP. But middle income countries, excluding China, 
also held in 2007 foreign exchange reserves equivalent to 20.6 percent, and low income 
countries 16.2 percent of GDP. In contrast, industrial countries excluding Japan only held 
reserves equivalent to 2.6 percent of GDP, a similar level to that of the 1970s and 1980s 
(see Figure 1). 
            Figure 1
International Reserves by Level of Development (% of GDP)



















































































The fact that Asian crisis was an even more important turning point than the Latin 
American debt crisis indicates another crucial issue: the clear perception in developing 
countries that the world lacked adequate institutions and mechanisms to manage crises 
that originate in the capital account, a point that has been analyzed in previous sections of 
this paper, as well as the excessive conditionality traditionally attached to emergency 
IMF financing. The demand for reserves may be seen, therefore, as massive “self-
insurance” or “self-protection” against crises. As Carvalho (2010) has suggested, this can 
be expressed as “precautionary” demand for international reserves. More precisely, the 
demand for self-protection through massive foreign exchange reserve accumulation can 
be seen as having three different motives. 
The first is protection against capital flow reversals. Since such reversal has been 
an embedded feature of global finance since the 1970s (they were also up to the Great 
Depression), there is a strong argument in favor of either adopting policies to reduce 
capital inflows or intervening heavily through sterilized intervention in foreign exchange 
markets that transform such temporary capital flows into international reserves. Since 
experience has indicated that letting temporary capital flows generate an exchange rate 
appreciation that leads to a current account deficit is a risky strategy, avoiding such 
appreciation and current account deterioration is an essential part of the rationale of this 
policy strategy. This implies that both sides of the national balance sheet grow, thus 
reducing the risks of capital reversals that characterize a balance sheet with a biased 
growth of external liabilities. Furthermore, to the extent that the major problem 
developing countries face is a medium-term cycle in the availability and costs of external 
financing, reserves should be proportional to total capital inflows and not only to short-
term flows. 
A similar logic applies to primary commodity exporting countries facing terms of 
trade shocks. Saving some of the exceptional export revenues associated with booming 
terms of trade, as well as associated fiscal revenues (particularly in energy and mineral-
exporting countries) has long been accepted as a rule in the demand for foreign exchange 
reserves. More generally, to the extent that international trade is pro-cyclical (a fact that 
has been made sharply evident by both the trade boom of the mid 2000s and the collapse 
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of international trade during the acute part of the crisis starting in the last quarter of 
2008), export booms always have a transitory component. It makes sense, therefore, to 
respond to cyclical swings in export revenues by accumulating the excess supply of 
foreign exchange during booms. The decision to avoid overspending the trade boom and, 
rather, accumulate what are perceived to be temporary export revenues as foreign 
exchange reserves, may be seen as a second motive behind self-protection. 
A third motive is that countries reject the only available form of “collective 
insurance” against balance of payments crises for two reasons. They find that it is 
insufficient relative to the magnitude of capital account shocks that developing countries 
face, a fact that relates in turn to the scale of financing available. They also regard that 
the conditionality associated with such lending had been unacceptable due to intrusive 
conditionality (of both macroeconomic and structural character), forcing countries to 
adopt strongly pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies during crises. 
There might also be “mercantilist” motives behind foreign exchange reserve 
accumulation. The “second Bretton Woods” literature (Dooley et al, 2003 and 2009) has 
argued, for example, that the “mercantilist” decision of the Asian countries to avoid 
exchange rate appreciation to sustain their export-led growth models explain their large 
current account surpluses and, therefore, their willingness to continue financing US 
deficits. The idea that stable and weak exchange rates and strong current account 
balances tend to accelerate economic growth in developing countries has, of course, a 
respectable tradition in the development literature (see a survey of that literature in 
Frenkel and Rapetti, 2010). However, one of the basic reasons why a strong current 
account is seen as one of the factors that has positive effects on growth is that it reduces 
the dependence on the volatility associated with capital flows. If this is the major reason, 
it would imply that the motivation is really self-protection rather than “mercantilism”.  
The pattern of reserve accumulation during the 1990s differs across countries and 
regions, reflecting different mixes of current and capital account imbalances as 
explanations of reserve accumulation (see also Akyüz, 2010). A first group of developing 
countries includes countries with current account deficits for which the only source of 
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reserve accumulation was net capital flows. This is the largest group, and incorporates 
whole regions (Central and Eastern Europe, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa), 
including major developing countries such as India, Turkey and, in the last part of the 
boom, Brazil, but also a large number of smaller countries. The second group includes 
countries that mixed current account and capital account surpluses, such as China and 
mineral exporters of Latin America and Africa. The third are basically energy exporters 
with strong current account surplus that are net exporters of capital. A basic reason for 
the surpluses of these countries as well as by mineral exporters has been the decision to 
save a larger part of the terms of trade boom than in the past. In any case, the basic reason 
for reserve accumulation in most of the developing world has been capital flows. Indeed, 
with the exception of years where reserve accumulation was associated to balance of 
payments adjustment programs (1999-2000), the major peaks in reserve accumulation in 
the developing world over the past two decades (1992-93, 1995, and 2003-07) have been 
booming capital flows.3 
This behavior raises, of course, some interesting policy questions. First, it is a 
costly strategy, as it involves a national loss equivalent to the difference between the 
financial cost of the liabilities vs. the yield of foreign exchange reserves. It makes, 
therefore, sense to try to reduce capital inflows in the first place (Rodrik, 2006; Ocampo, 
2007/08). Second, if many developing countries pursue this strategy at the same time, 
they generate “fallacy of composition” effects that feed into global imbalances. If a large 
group of developing countries follows this route, they generate a current account surplus 
and an additional demand for safe assets that is contractionary in its effects on the world 
economy unless it is matched by current account deficits and the supply of those assets 
by industrial countries. The United States has been supplying both those deficits and 
assets (US Treasury bonds) in recent years, but this is not necessarily a stable situation.  
Self-protection is not only a costly form of insurance for individual countries but 
also a source of instability to the global economy. However, the problem cannot be 
                                                 
3 For developing countries, excluding China and the Middle East, the correlation of variation of reserves 
with net capital flows (both as a proportion of GDP) is 0.715 for the period 1982-2007, whereas that 
between the current account and reserve accumulation is actually negative and not statistically significant (-
0.165). 
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solved simply by asking developing countries to appreciate their currencies to correct 
their balance of payments surpluses. It must solve first the source of the demand for self-
protection, which are strong pro-cyclical capital and trade flows and the lack of adequate 
supply of collective insurance against balance of payments crises. 
B. Reforming the system 
Although past discussions indicate that there are several possible ways to reform 
the system, the easiest is to complete the reforms of the 1960s, when SDRs were created. 
Obviously, the role of SDRs has changed since then (Clark and Polak, 2004). The issues 
of adequate provision of international liquidity, which was at the center of early post-war 
debates and in the 1960s are not important now. Indeed, except from extraordinary 
conjunctures (such as the world financial collapse of September and October 2008), the 
fiduciary dollar standard actually provide enough (and possibly even excessive) liquidity. 
However, other problems continue to be or are even more important today, particularly 
those associated with the composition of world reserves, the access to liquidity by 
developing countries and associated equity issues. 
Allocations of SDRs have been made on three occasions: 1970-72 and 1979-81 
and in 2009. The first two amounted to only SDR 21.4 billion, equivalent to about $32 
billion or 0.5% of world reserves when the recent global financial crisis struck. There was 
also a one-time allocation that was agreed in 1997, which would have doubled SDR 
allocations and would have compensated those countries which had become IMF 
members after the two original allocations had been made (over a quarter of current 
members joined the Fund after 1981 and so have received no allocations of SDRs). 
However, the amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement of which it was part –the 
fourth in the history of the Fund— only became effective upon approval by US Congress 
in 2009. The G-20 pushed, in turn, in 2009 for a new general allocation equivalent to 
$250 billion, less than $100 billion of which went directly to emerging and developing 
economies. 
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Previously the cessation of SDR allocations over almost three decades had 
negative effects for developing countries and the world economy, as it actually coincided 
with their growing demand for foreign exchange reserves. 
Several proposals to renew SDR allocations on a more systematic basis have been 
made in recent years, following two different models. The first is issuing SDRs in a 
counter-cyclical way, concentrating them essentially in periods of world financial stress 
and possibly destroying them partly once financial conditions normalize (United Nations, 
1999; Camdessus, 2000; Ocampo, 2002; Akyüz, 2005). The second model proposes 
regular allocations of SDRs similar to the additional world demand for reserves. 
According to the average demand for reserves in 1990-2002, this should be at least $110-
150 billion, but possibly much more, as that figure jumped to $777 billion in 2003-07. 
This is also the magnitude of SDRs that must be issued in the long term under a counter-
cyclical rule. 
As argued above, SDRs are the best mechanism to finance the IMF. An SDR-
based Fund would have two essential counter-cyclical instruments. The first are counter-
cyclical allocations of SDRs, which represent in the traditional terminology of the Fund 
“unconditional” liquidity. The second is counter-cyclical lending financed by SDRs. 
There are two ways of doing it. As suggested by Polak (2005, chs. 7-8), IMF lending 
during crises could simply create SDRs, in a similar way as lending by central banks 
create domestic money. When loans are paid back, such issues would be automatically 
destroyed. The alternative, recommended by Ocampo (2002 and 2010) would treat SDRs 
that are not used by industrial countries or developing counties that have adequate 
reserves as deposits in (or lending to) the IMF, which can be used by the institution to 
lend to countries in need. Whereas the limits on lending under the first option would be 
the overall level of quotas (which would now have a more notional value, as national 
resources are not actually transferred to the Fund), in the second it would be the total 
allocation of SDRs. Any of these alternatives would improve collective insurance. For 
this to work, however, it is of course essential that IMF credit lines, their conditionality 
and the stigma associated with borrowing from this institution be fully overcome, as we 
discussed in previous sections of this paper. 
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Although an SDR-based global reserve system would go a long way to solve the 
Triffin dilemma, it would not correct the increasing inequity issues associated with the 
demand for reserves. The basic problem here is that current IMF quota allocations, which 
are also the basis for SDR issues and individual lending limits, not only do not reflect the 
realities of the world economy today but, most importantly, do not respond to the huge 
disparity in the demand for reserves by developing vs. industrial economies, which are at 
the center of both the inequities of the current reserve system and the inequity-instability 
links highlighted above. 
This problem can be corrected only with either one or a mix of three types of 
reforms (since they are not mutually exclusive), which complement the system of 
allocation of SDRs and SDR-financed lending outlined above. The first would be the 
allocation of SDRs according to the demand for reserves rather than quotas, which imply 
that a large proportion of them would go to developing countries. The second is to create 
a “development link” in SDR allocations. One way to do it would be to use the allocation 
of SDRs to industrial countries to finance development assistance or the provision of 
global public goods (Stiglitz 2006, ch. 9; Ffrench-Davis, 2007). Another way is that 
recommended by the Group of Experts convened by UNCTAD in the debates of the 
1960s: allowing the IMF to buy bonds from multilateral development banks (UNCTAD, 
1965). The third is encouraging the creation of regional reserve arrangements among 
developing countries—such as the Latin American Reserve Fund and the Chiang Mai 
Agreement—that provide a complementary form of collective insurance. To create 
incentives to the formation of such arrangements, the allocations of SDRs could be made 
proportional not only to IMF quotas but also to reserves that developing countries have 
placed in common reserve funds (United Nations, 1999; Ocampo, 2002). 
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